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NOTE
Second Injury Funds Nationally and in
Missouri – Liability, Functionality, and
Viability in Modern Times
Rhett Buchmiller*

I. INTRODUCTION
A Second Injury Fund (“SIF”) is a statutory form of workers’ compensation relief operating under state law.1 SIFs allow employers to reduce their
own liability for a worker’s injury if part of the harm from that injury was
caused by a previously existing disability.2 The need for SIFs arises from the
possibility that workers with prior injuries who are then reinjured are likely to
experience greater harm than other workers.3 As a result, employers could be
exposed to greater liability, which might incentivize employers to discriminate
against potential employees with previous injuries.4
SIFs are designed to prevent discrimination against potential employees
who have pre-existing medical disabilities by eliminating the financial burden
that may be placed on the employer due to the increased risk associated with
employing a previously injured employee.5 SIF statutes achieve their goals by
allowing either the employer/insurer or the injured employee to file claims
against the SIF in the state’s workers compensation system, requesting either
“permanent total disability” benefits, and/or, in some states, “permanent partial
disability” benefits.6
While a major component of workers’ compensation systems for much of
the twentieth century, legislatures across the country have discontinued SIFs
* B.A., University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, 2016; J.D. Candidate, University of

Missouri School of Law, 2020; Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review,
2019-2020. I would like to thank Professor Rafael Gely and the Missouri Law Review
staff for their advice and guidance in writing this article.
1. Second Injury Fund, MO. DEP’T OF LAB. AND INDUS. REL., https://labor.mo.gov/DWC/Division_Units/SIF_Unit/sif_home [perma.cc/8MJD-HHJF].
2. Id.
3. Harry W. Dahl, The Iowa Second Injury Fund – Time for Change, 39 DRAKE
L. REV. 101, 103 (1989).
4. Id.
5. R. Shafer, Twelve Things You Should Know About Subsequent Injury Funds
and Disabled Workers, AMAXX WORKERS COMP RESOURCE CTR. (May 8, 2010),
https://blog.reduceyourworkerscomp.com/2010/05/twelve-things-you-should-knowabout-subsequent-injury-funds-and-disabled-workers/ [perma.cc/44D9-AK46].
6. Id.
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over the last twenty years.7 Two main reasons inform these efforts: funding
concerns and perceived redundancies created by the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).8
Like many other state legislatures, the Missouri General Assembly addressed the issue of what to do with their SIF in 2013. The legislature, ignoring
national trends, enacted legislation intended to provide additional funds to the
Missouri Second Injury Fund (“Missouri SIF”) while simultaneously narrowing its scope.9 This simple concept was disrupted in 2017 by the decision in
Gattenby v. Treasurer of Missouri,10 where the Missouri Court of Appeals for
the Western District effectively nullified the 2013 Amendments for a term of
years.11
The reasoning of Gattenby raised several questions about the future of the
Missouri SIF. Part II focuses first on the historical origins of SIFs in order to
demonstrate their purpose and illustrate how SIFs were designed to achieve
their goals. Part III will then discuss recent trends nationally, especially in light
of the ADA, which caused the closure of many SIFs. Lastly, Part IV will turn
to the Missouri SIF and examine how Missouri conformed to national trends
and what this has done recently in light of these trends.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The SIF for the State of Missouri and similar injury funds across the nation were initially created for similar purposes: to stop discrimination against
disabled workers in the hiring process and to encourage the retention of workers by limiting potential employer liability in case of reinjury.12
The operation of SIFs is best illustrated with a hypothetical scenario.13
During a previous job, an employee lost his right hand. Despite this, later in

7. David Tobenkin Don’t Overlook Second-Injury Funds, SOC’Y FOR HUM.
RESOURCE MGMT. (July 1, 2009), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/pages/0709employmentlaw.aspx [perma.cc/SA7W-A3F3].
8. Id.
9. Governor Nixon Signs Legislation to Address Missouri’s Failing Second Injury Fund, AARON SACHS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. BLOG (Jul. 12, 2013), https://www.autoinjury.com/blog/2013/july/governor-nixon-signs-legislation-to-address-miss/
[perma.cc/WE8W-7MT2].
10. 516 S.W.3d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017), overruled by Cosby v. Treasurer of Missouri, 579 S.W.3d 202, 205 n.5 (Mo. 2019).
11. Id. at 862.; but see infra Part III.B for a discussion of recent case law overruling Gattenby.
12. Wuebbeling v. West Cty. Drywall, 898 S.W.2d 615, 617–18 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995) (referring to permanent total disability but also saying the same concept applies
to permanent partial disability).
13. For simplicity, this scenario utilizes Missouri case law but only does so to illustrate the basic functionality of the SIF, which is common to all similar funds.
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life he managed to find work with a different employer, one which only required him to use one hand. While working for his new employer, he lost his
left hand. Normally the loss of the left hand, while debilitating, would not
totally disable him. The problem arises when the prior loss of his right hand is
also considered. These two injuries, his prior right hand loss and his subsequent left hand loss, combine to create an overall greater disability – now he
cannot perform any jobs at all – rendering him totally disabled. This combined
effect is not attributable to either employer as each was only responsible for the
injury that occurred while the employee worked for them. After the employers
pay for each hand, who compensates the employee for the combined effect of
both injuries?
Without SIF-like statutes, the employee’s most recent employer would
bear the heavy burden of total disability liability, which in Missouri is defined
as an “inability to compete on the open labor market,” instead of the injury for
which the employer was actually responsible.14 With SIF-like statutes, the employer is responsible only for the disability caused by the subsequent injury
that occurred while the employee was working for the employer.15 The remaining liability, namely the “extra” liability caused by the combination of the
prior and subsequent injuries, would fall to the SIF.16 In short, each employer
would be responsible for paying disability benefits arising from each respective
injury that occurred while the employee worked for them. The SIF would be
responsible for paying the excess disability caused by the combined injuries.17
New York enacted the first of these funds, the “Special Disability Fund,”
in 1916.18 The Special Disability Fund set out a scheme by which employers
would not be liable for the entire degree of a worker’s injury and the state
would fund part of the employee’s disability benefits.19 This fund was only
available if the employee was totally disabled due to the combination of a
preexisting disability and the work injury itself.20 An increased demand for
protection of previously disabled workers due to World War II prompted the
International Association of Industrial Accidents Boards and Commissions
(“IAIABC”) to create a model for SIF statutes.21 Thirty-three states adopted a

14. Fed. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 371 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Mo. 1963).
15. Pierson v. Treasurer of Mo., 126 S.W.3d 386, 389 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (per

curiam).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 388–89.
18. Second Injury Funds, NANOPDF.COM, 2 (Apr. 30, 2018), https://nano-

pdf.com/download/second-injury-funds_pdf# [perma.cc/HD85-5THX] [hereinafter
SIF]. Other similar funds are modernly referred to as “Second Injury Fund,” “Subsequent Injury Fund,” “Special Compensation Fund,” etc. Id. at 1.
19. Id. at 2.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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SIF-like statute in the years immediately following World War II, with the majority adopting the model nearly as written.22 By 1991, practically all states
had a SIF.23

A. Typical Historic Variations among Second Injury Funds
Although adopted by a majority of jurisdictions, the model changed over
time. The statutes creating these funds vary in terms of the liability imposed,
funding sources, and general structure.24 The model proposed by the IAIABC
only allowed for liability in the event that an employee was totally disabled
because the employee had previously lost a body part – hand, arm, or leg – in
the past and lost their corresponding body part on the job.25 Nebraska’s statute
reflects a typical modern approach, as it was in effect in 1997 prior to its closure.26 The statute has been reproduced below:
If an employee who has a preexisting permanent partial disability
whether from compensable injury or otherwise, which is or is likely to
be a hindrance or obstacle to his or her obtaining employment or obtaining reemployment if the employee should become unemployed and
which was known to the employer prior to the occurrence of a subsequent compensable injury, receives a subsequent compensable injury
resulting in additional permanent partial or in permanent total disability
so that the degree or percentage of disability caused by the combined
disabilities is substantially greater than that which would have resulted
from the last injury, considered alone and of itself, and if the employee
is entitled to receive compensation on the basis of the combined disabilities, the employer at the time of the last injury shall be liable only
for the degree or percentage of disability which would have resulted
from the last injury had there been no preexisting disability. 27

This statute expanded on the original model in a number of ways but was
also self-limited to better conform with the original model’s intent.28 Specifi-

22. Id.
23. Id. at 10.
24. See infra App. A (listing each state’s current or former statutes outlining lia-

bility under the relevant SIF law, with few exceptions). Further references to a state’s
SIF statute will be referring to Appendix A. This appendix was compiled by the author.
25. Second Injury Funds, supra note 1, at 2.
26. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-128 (LexisNexis 2014). Often Second Injury
Funds are not repealed outright; instead, they are closed from further claims. This has
the purpose of allowing already adjudicated claims to continue being compensated but
stops new claims from coming in.
27. Id.
28. Second Injury Funds, supra note 1.
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cally, the Nebraska statute, which further developed the original model proposed by the IAIABC, makes compensation for the combined effect of preexisting disabilities and subsequent injuries acceptable.29 It self-limits by requiring the combined effect of the two injuries to make the overall disability “substantially greater,” a minimum threshold that is present in many SIF-like statutes.30

1. Acceptable Pre-Existing Disabilities
States vary in terms of what pre-existing disabilities qualify for coverage
under the SIF statute in the event of subsequent injury. Some states have expanded the scope of injuries that qualify as preexisting.31 For instance, twelve
of the most recent SIF statutes require that the preexisting disability be on a
specific list of disabilities.32 Some states, such as Pennsylvania, stick closely
to the original model by only allowing SIF compensation in the event of a subsequent injury if the preexisting injury is the loss of use of a hand, arm, foot,
leg, or eye.33 Other SIFs, such as Ohio, specify a lengthy list of potential preexisting disabilities, including epilepsy, amputation, black lung disease, and Parkinson’s disease.34
The remaining thirty-six funds have a greater variety of potential preexisting disabilities because they do not specify a list of compensable disabilities.35 However, many states, such as Nevada, require that the previous disability constitute a “hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment.”36 Courts
have generally interpreted this language to mean only that a pre-existing injury
has the potential to combine with a new injury to constitute a hindrance or
obstacle in obtaining employment, not that it actually does so.37 Some states
have lowered their potential liability more directly by requiring the minimum
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-128 (LexisNexis 2000).
Id.
Second Injury Funds, supra note 1, at 2–3.
See App. A. These states are Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.
33. 77 PA. STAT. AND CONST. STAT. ANN. § 516 (West 2019).
34. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.343 (West 2018).
35. See App. A. These states are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
36. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 616B.587(3) (LexisNexis 2014).
37. Concepcion v. Lear Corp., 173 S.W.3d 368, 371 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting
E.W. v. Kan. City, Mo. Sch. Dist., 89 S.W.3d 527, 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)), overruled
on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003)
(en banc)).
29.
30.
31.
32.
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threshold of disability to be a certain “percent” before the preexisting disability
qualifies.38 The guidelines for calculating these percentages vary greatly, but
many states require medical doctors to determine the percentage of disability.39
Another variation occurs from the nature of the preexisting injury, with at
least five states requiring the cause to be from a prior industrial accident.40 The
remaining forty-three states with functionally-equivalent SIF statutes41 use language such as “from any cause,”42 or “from compensable injury, occupational
disease, pre-existing disease, or otherwise.”43 This kind of language allows a
much more expansive set of potential preexisting disabilities to qualify for SIF
liability.
The most common differentiating factor between typical SIF liability in
these states was the requirement that an employer be aware of the preexisting
condition prior to hiring or retention of the employee.44 Approximately twelve
states required that the employer be aware of the preexisting condition at the
time of hiring or the time the second injury occurred.45 The statutory language
that required the employer’s knowledge generally stated that “[i]n order to
qualify for reimbursement . . . the employer must establish . . . that the employer
had knowledge of the permanent physical impairment at the time that the employee was hired.”46 Some states require written confirmation of this
knowledge: “[T]he employer . . . must establish by written records that it had
knowledge of the preexisting disability at the time the employee was hired.”47
Conversely, some states, such as Minnesota, require that the preexisting disability be registered with the state or the employer prior to the subsequent injury,
bypassing the need for knowledge.48

38. Sachi Barreiro, How Do Disability Ratings Work for Workers’ Compensation?, ALLLAW, http://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/workers-compensation/disability-ratings.html (last visited May 23, 2019) [perma.cc/2XL7-G3AW].
39. Id.
40. See App. A. These states are Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Rhode Island, and
Texas.
41. Id. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
42. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.205 (West 2018).
43. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.120 (West 2018).
44. See SIF, supra note 18.
45. See App. A. These states are Arizona, Alaska, Florida, Louisiana, Kansas,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and
Tennessee.
46. S.C. CODE. ANN. § 42-9-400 (2018).
47. 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-37-4 (1997) (repealed 1998).
48. MINN. STAT. § 176.131 (1991) (repealed 1992).
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2. Variations in Minimum Injury Thresholds to Trigger SIF Liability
The intent of SIFs has historically been to prevent employers from being
saddled with extra liability for employing a worker who is more likely to incur
larger disability payments than a non-disabled worker.49 This was true with
the original model proposed by the IAIABC, which only allowed for SIF liability in the event of a total disability, and it has continued with a number of
modern SIFs.50
A different type of liability emerged with the later adoption of language
that allowed for liability if the preexisting and subsequent injuries combined to
create a disability that was “substantially greater . . . than that which would
have resulted from the subsequent injury alone.”51 Today, fifteen states define
SIF eligibility as total disability – though the definition of total disability varies.52 The states that do not have this absolute bar to permanent partial disability claims sometimes require the employer to pay a certain amount of the combined effect.53 For example, in Minnesota, the employer must pay the first
fifty-two weeks of monetary benefits to the employee.54 Other states require
the combined effect to meet a statutory minimum of disability. 55 California,
for example, requires the combined effect to create a permanent disability of
seventy percent or more.56

B. The Missouri SIF Historically
Missouri’s SIF was originally created in 1943, following the national
trend of establishing SIFs to deal with the influx of veterans from World War

49. WORKERS’ COMP PRACTICE GRP., Issue # 43 Status of Second Injury Funds,
SEDGWICK: SPOTLIGHT ON WORKERS’ COMP. (Dec. 7, 2012), https://www.sedgwick.com/assets/uploads/documents/Issue-43-StatusofSecondInjuryFunds.pdf.
[perma.cc/4Q66-BS5S].
50. Id.
51. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-400 (2018).
52. See App. A. (these states are Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia); compare TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.161
(West 2018) (requiring the injury to result in a specific loss of major functionality, extremity, or organ in order to receive total disability benefits) with Stoddard v. Hagadone
Corp., 147 P.3d 162, 167 (Idaho 2009) (requiring the injury to only limit the employee
so that no reasonable market for their services exist).
53. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.131 (West 1990) (repealed 1992).
54. Id.
55. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4751 (2019).
56. Id. For a discussion on how disability percentages are generally calculated,
see Settling a Case, MO. DEP’T LAB. AND INDUS. REL., https://labor.mo.gov/DWC/Injured_Workers/settling_case#TOI10D [perma.cc/6LWU-Q6RD].
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II.57 Missouri’s 1991 SIF allowed for workers’ eligible preexisting disabilities
to be from nearly any source that constituted a “compensable injury or otherwise.”58 Missouri’s 1991 SIF also allowed for the resulting disability to be
either partial or total in degree, with no minimums for the amount of change
resulting from the combination.59 Missouri’s SIF has never had a knowledge
or certification requirement.60
The mode of liability for Missouri’s 1991 SIF also protected employers
directly by absolving them of liability and only giving the option of SIF liability to the employee via separate suit.61 The requirement for finding permanent
partial disability was that the effects of the preexisting and subsequent disabilities combined were “greater than the sum of the degree or percentage of the
two disabilities.”62 For a finding of permanent total disability, the employee
had to be incapable of competing on the open labor market, as established by
expert testimony.63 The primary difference between these two standards was
that in the former, an employee was still capable of finding work while in the
latter, they were not. In Missouri today, this distinction is not about the employee’s ability to work anywhere but the employee’s ability to compete with
non-disabled workers on the open labor market.64 Missouri’s 1991 SIF also
served as a fallback insurer for injured employees that worked for employers
without proper workers’ compensation insurance.65

III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
This section will focus on the recent developments of SIF statutes nationally and in Missouri specifically.

57. Jason McClitis, Missouri’s Second Injury Fund – Should It Stay or Should It
Go: An Examination of the Question Facing the Missouri State Legislature, 74 MO. L.
REV. 399, 401 (2009).
58. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.220.1 (2018).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Brown v. Treasurer of Mo. 795 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 483.
64. Id.
65. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.220.5 (2018).
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A. National Trends in the Wake of the Americans with Disabilities Act
Today, SIFs face extinction for two main reasons: they are subject to a
greater deal of liability than anticipated and legislators see the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) as an adequate replacement.66
Today, active SIFs have become far less common due to a number of factors, but most notably67 because the ADA was passed in 1990.68 The ADA’s
stated purpose is to provide a “national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”69 The ADA applies to employers
which have fifteen or more employees,70 whereas SIFs are not subject to this
limitation.71 To achieve its goal, the ADA allows workers who believe they
have been discriminated against to sue their past, present, and future employers.72
In theory, the ADA “bans any discrimination against qualified handicapped job applicants.”73 Therefore, the SIF’s role in preventing discrimination against people with disabilities in the hiring process “ceases to exist.”74
Each of the eighteen states that have nullified their SIFs, through repeal or closure, have done so since the passage of the ADA.75

66. A Review of the South Carolina Second Injury Fund, S.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY:
LEGIS. AUDIT COUNCIL (Mar. 2007), https://lac.sc.gov/sites/default/files/Documents/Legislative%20Audit%20Council/Reports/A-K/SIF.pdf.
[perma.cc/8DK38VZF] [hereinafter S.C. Audit].
67. Id.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012).
69. Id.
70. § 12111.
71. Timothy R. Hancock, Comment, Apportionment Between Preexisting Conditions and Work-Related Injuries: Why Wyoming Needs a Second Injury Fund, 11 WYO.
L. REV. 525, 543 (2011).
72. Id.
73. Catherine M. Doud, Oklahoma’s Special Indemnity Fund: A Fund Without A
Function?, 30 TULSA L.J. 754, 765 (1995).
74. Id.
75. Hancock, supra note 71, at 529 n.42; see also supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
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The ADA is not the sole cause of the repeal of SIF-like statutes, as states
like South Carolina,76 Connecticut,77 and Georgia78 have abolished their SIF
statutes for other reasons. Another problem SIF-like statutes have encountered
is underestimated levels of liability. The loss of SIF funds came from either
direct repeal of SIF statutes or the phasing out of the statutes by restricting
claims for injuries that occurred past certain dates (or “sunsetting”).79 To date,
of the forty-seven states that once had an active SIF statute, eighteen states
have either repealed or sunsetted their SIF statute.80
Alternatively, opponents of SIFs argue that SIF statutes “have failed to
meet the objective of promoting the hiring of disabled workers.”81 Representatives of former SIFs have opined that their states have not suffered particularly
negative effects following the closure of their SIFs.82 However, no comprehensive studies compare the states that have eliminated their SIFs with those
that have not.83

B. Missouri SIF, A Work In Progress
In 1993, Missouri altered its SIF eligibility requirements in response to a
wave of changes across the country.84 Namely, the SIF was amended to include
76. South Carolina’s SIF was consistently cited by its opponents as having “billions of dollars” of unfunded liabilities. Martin M. Simons, A Review of the South Carolina
Second
Injury
Fund,
REIMBURSEMENT
CONSULTANTS
INC.,
http://rcinc.us/pdfs/A%20reiew%20of%20the%20SC%20SIF.pdf (last visited May 24,
2019) [perma.cc/F7UN-J53M].
77. Connecticut’s SIF funding was consistently outpaced by its liabilities until
eventually it reached an estimated six billion dollars of liability. Zachary D. Schurin,
Monkey-Business: Connecticut’s Six Billion Dollar Gorilla and the Insufficiency of the
Emergence of the ADA as Justification for the Elimination of Second Injury Funds, 7
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 135, 135 (2007).
78. Georgia’s SIF had steadily increasing liability up until it sunsetted in 2006.
Subsequent Injury Trust Fund: Claims Evaluation & Payment History, STATE OF GA.,
2
(2010),
https://sitf.georgia.gov/sites/sitf.georgia.gov/files/imported/SITF/Files/Stats%20CY%202010.pdf [perma.cc/QR56-RPSP].
79. Tobenkin, supra note 7.
80. See App. A (these states are Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, New
York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia). Oregon and Wyoming are not included in this analysis, as they have never had
a SIF statute, and Vermont is not included as its SIF statute was repealed before it was
ever active. See S.C. Audit, supra note 66; Hancock, supra note 71.
81. Christopher Boggs, Second Injury Funds: Are They Still Necessary or Just a
Drain On the System?, INS. J. (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.insurancejournal.com/blogs/academy-journal/2015/03/25/360666.htm [perma.cc/UB7P-LFNG].
82. S.C. Audit, supra note 66.
83. Hancock, supra note 71, at 540.
84. See MO. REV. STAT. § 287.220.1 (2018).
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minimum thresholds for preexisting disabilities and subsequent injuries.85 At
a minimum, to qualify for SIF coverage, a preexisting disability and the subsequent injury individually had to equal fifty weeks of compensability if done to
the body as a whole – anything not an extremity – and fifteen percent disability
if done to a major extremity – arm or leg.86 Lawmakers also introduced language requiring the preexisting disability to be a “hindrance or obstacle” to
employment.87 These limitations were put in place to “eliminate inconsistencies” and “provide a more objective standard” to determine the Missouri SIF’s
liability.88 As part of the amendments, the Director of the Division of Workers’
Compensation had the ability to set surcharges to workers’ compensation premiums at an amount necessary to cover the Missouri SIF’s obligations.89 The
amendments gave the Director this power, as there was no cap on the surcharge
which funded the SIF.90 In 2005, a cap was placed on the Missouri SIF which
inhibited the Missouri SIF’s ability to pay claims.91
Two audits, released in 2007, discussed the threat of insolvency faced by
the SIF and offered possible solutions.92 The most recent audit reported that
the SIF’s expenditures had more than tripled over the course of ten years, resulting in total expenditures of $63.9 million in 2006.93 The Committee on
Legislative Oversight acknowledged that multiple reports found the SIF would
soon be insolvent and recommended changes of its own.94 The Committee’s
report found that the SIF was struggling due to an increase in claims filed despite a consistent number of workplace injuries.95 This change effected the
solvency of the SIF because the funding remained the same but liability did

Id.
Id.
Id.
Loven v. Greene Cty., 63 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Culp
v. Lohr Distrib. Co, 898 S.W.2d 613, 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995), overruled in part on
other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003) (en
banc)).
89. Skirvin v. Treasurer of Mo., No. 75541, 2013 WL 216028, at *15 (Mo. Ct.
App. Jan. 22, 2013).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. McClitis, supra note 57, at 408–09.
93. Review of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations: Second Injury
Fund, OVERSIGHT DIV.: COMM. ON LEGIS. RES., iv (2007) (recommending changes to
encourage settlement of claims, increasing the minimum threshold for prior disabilities,
and limiting the type of prior disability that could be considered) [hereinafter Review],
http://www.moga.mo.gov/oversight/over07/PDF/Second%20Injury%20Fund.pdf
[perma.cc/RG5G-Z2R4].
94. Id.
95. Id. at 3.
85.
86.
87.
88.
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not.96 The funding remained the same because the number of workplace injuries was not changing.97 Despite this, the number of SIF claims rose, putting
the SIF in the precarious position of trying to compensate more workers with
the same budget.98 To deal with the solvency issue, the audits recommended
either limiting the potential liability of the SIF legislatively or increasing the
statutorily authorized three percent surcharge that funded the SIF.99
The Committee’s predictions were fully realized in 2012, when the SIF
began to delay payments due to insufficient funds.100 From July 2012 until
November 2015, the SIF did not have the necessary funds to meet its obligations for permanent partial disability claims.101 In fact, the SIF settled a total
of only forty claims from 2010 to 2012.102 Comparing this to the 2,905 claims
settled in 2009 alone,103 this decline shows that the SIF was experiencing the
effects of its limitations.
The General Assembly responded with the 2013 Amendments, which
elected to limit liability and increase funding, if only for a short time.104 The
General Assembly authorized a three percent increase to the surcharge, which
would fund the SIF, from 2014 until 2021.105 This measure doubled the funding of the SIF.106 Additionally, the General Assembly severely limited the
combined results that qualified for liability under the SIF.107 On its face, it
appeared that no claims could be filed against the SIF for permanent partial
disability benefits under Section 287.220.3 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri
after January 1, 2014.108 The General Assembly also limited the scope of
preexisting disabilities that could be considered for a claim against the SIF for
permanent total disability benefits.109 On its face, the statute appeared to limit
preexisting disabilities – no matter when they occurred – to disabilities stemming only from military duty, a prior work injury, preexisting disabilities
Id.
McClitis, supra note 57, at 408.
Id. at 409.
Review, supra note 93, at 33–34.
MO. DIV. OF WORKER’S COMP., 2017 Annual Report, MO. DEP’T LAB. &
INDUS. RELATIONS, 25 (2017) [hereinafter 2017 Annual Report], https://labor.mo.gov/sites/labor/files/pubs_forms/DWC2017AnnualReport.pdf.
[perma.cc/U6YM-B7ZW].
101. Id.
102. Id. at 23.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 3.
105. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.715.6 (2018).
106. MO. DIV. OF WORKER’S COMP., 2014 Annual Report, DEP’T LAB. & INDUS.
RELATIONS,
9
(2014),
https://labor.mo.gov/sites/labor/files/pubs_forms/DWC2014AnnualReport.pdf. [perma.cc/9627-27H6].
107. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.220.3(2) (2018).
108. Id.
109. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.220.3(2)(a) (2018).
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
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which directly and significantly aggravate the subsequent injury, and preexisting injuries which resulted in the loss of a major extremity.110 Before the 2013
Amendments took effect, 8,072 SIF claims were filed in 2013.111 In 2014,
2015, and 2016, the SIF saw the claims filed decrease to 5,504; 3,121; and
2,469, respectively.112 This significant decrease shows the beginning of a more
pragmatic and sustainable Missouri SIF.
In Gattenby v. Treasurer of Missouri,113 the Missouri Court of Appeals
for the Western District came to a controversial decision which changed this
trend of reduced SIF claims.114 The plaintiff in Gattenby suffered a workplace
injury to his right knee in March of 2014 and had prior injuries from 2007,
2009, and 2010.115 The Missouri SIF appealed a decision made by an administrative law judge that awarded permanent total disability benefits under Section 287.220.2, arguing that the administrative law judge erred in applying this
section instead of the new, more stringent 2013 Amendments.116 In its analysis, the court parsed the language used in Section 287.220.3(1), which read
“[a]ll claims against the second injury fund for injuries occurring after January
1, 2014, and all claims against the second injury fund involving a subsequent
compensable injury which is an occupational disease filed after January 1,
2014, shall be compensated as provided in this subsection.”117 On its face,
Section 287.220.3(1) seemed to require application of the more stringent Section 287.220.3 to any claims for injury that occurred after January 1, 2014.118
The Western District, however, did not agree with this interpretation.119
The Western District noted that when it came to occupational diseases,
the General Assembly specifically wrote “subsequent” instead of “prior” or
“all.”120 The court determined that by referring to “subsequent occupational
diseases” the General Assembly intended the new, more stringent, provision to
apply to any claim utilizing only a subsequent occupational disease.121
The court then turned to the provision which stated, “All claims against
the second injury fund for injuries occurring after January 1, 2014 . . . shall be
compensated as provided in this subsection.”122 The court noted that the General Assembly did not make the same distinction with occupational diseases,
instead the General Assembly said “subsequent compensable injuries” when
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
2017 Annual Report, supra note 100, at 22.
Id.
516 S.W.3d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017).
Id. at 860.
Id.
Id. at 861.
Id. at 862; MO. REV. STAT. § 287.220.3(1) (2018).
Gattenby, 516 S.W.3d at 862.
Id. at 862–63.
Id. at 862.
Id.
Id. at 861.
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referring to an occupational disease.123 The court reasoned that since in one
instance the statute said “for injuries” and in another it said “subsequent compensable injuries,” the General Assembly intended the former to encompass all
injuries whereas the latter encompassed only compensable ones.124 The court
held that for all injuries that are not occupational diseases, both the preexisting
disability and the subsequent injury must occur after January 1, 2014 for the
more stringent 2013 Amendments of Section 287.220.3 to apply.125
This resulted in the use of pre-2013 provisions of Section 287.220, which
were much more favorable to the awarding of total disability benefits, in the
event that any preexisting injury occurred before 2014.126 Before Gattenby,
SIF claims had declined from 24,313 open claims against the SIF in 2015 to
20,865 open claims in 2016.127 Following this ruling, however, the number of
claims filed against the SIF spiked to 3,953 in 2017, compared to the 3,121 and
2,469 claims filed in 2015 and 2016, respectively.128 Despite the court’s holding in Gattenby, the Missouri SIF refused to compensate claims for partial disability benefits filed after 2014, following the mandate of Section
287.220.3(2).129
This decision was validated in the recent Missouri Supreme Court decision Cosby v. Treasurer of Missouri.130 In Cosby, the Missouri Supreme Court
considered whether Section 287.220.3 applied to a plaintiff who received an
injury in 2014.131 Following the clear intent of the General Assembly – evidenced by how it defined “injury” – and the plain and ordinary meaning of the
statute, the court determined that Section 287.220.3 should apply to all claims
for work-related injuries that occur after January 1, 2014.132

Id. at 862.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 862–63.
MO. DIV. OF WORKER’S COMP., 2016 Annual Report, MO. DEP’T LAB. &
INDUS. RELATIONS, 23 (2016), https://labor.mo.gov/sites/labor/files/2016-DWCAnnual-Report.pdf [perma.cc/X9VR-WSQL]; MO. DIV. OF WORKER’S COMP., 2015
Annual Report, MO. DEP’T LAB. & INDUS. RELATIONS, 23 (2015), https://labor.mo.gov/sites/labor/files/pubs_forms/DWC2015AnnualReport.pdf.
[perma.cc/UXT2-8UP8].
128. 2017 Annual Report, supra note 100.
129. Missouri Labor Commission States Employers Are Now Responsible for Enhanced Permanent Partial Disability Benefits in a Shift Away from the Second Injury
Fund, EDELMAN L. OFF. BLOG (Aug. 24, 2017), http://www.edelmanlawoffice.com/missouri-labor-commission-states-employers-now-responsible-enhancedpermanent-partial-disability-benefits-shift-away-second-injury-fund/
[perma.cc/8DED-WQFE].
130. No. SC 97317, 2019 WL 2588575, at *1 (Mo. June 25, 2019).
131. Id.
132. Id. at *4.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
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IV. DISCUSSION
SIFs and their counterparts throughout the United States cause problems
for states that retain them. They can be difficult to maintain due to their high
amount of liability over time but can also be difficult to repeal because they
support vulnerable, sympathetic constituents, such as war veterans.133 The
ADA provided legislators with the justification necessary to eliminate the SIFs
of their states while limiting political backlash.134
Discrimination against disabled workers is still a prevalent issue, and the
ADA has not solved the problem.135 Disabled workers’ employment has been
in decline since the ADA was passed.136 Data shows that 2,107,000 disabled
workers were employed in 2014 – an all-time low despite significant population increases.137 This could be due in part to issues inherent with the ADA
itself. The ADA has the paradoxical effect of discouraging the hiring of disabled employees despite clear impetus to hire them.138 This is because the ADA
mandates reasonable accommodations from employers for their employees.139
These accommodations generate expenses that are avoided where possible –
despite the unambiguous illegality and threat of litigation under the ADA –
because accommodations can be prohibitively expensive or impractical. 140
This is especially true considering the thresholds for disabilities under the ADA
leave much to be desired and are considered under-inclusive in terms of covering disabled workers.141
However, this decline has been sharper in states that have eliminated their
SIFs since 2004, with a 9% decrease in disabled unemployment for SIF retaining states and a 23% decrease in disabled unemployment for SIF eliminating
states.142 Despite the apparent negative impact of the ADA on hiring disabled
workers, the effect is even worse in states which have no SIF to cushion the

Tobenkin, supra note 7.
See Schurin, supra note77, at 136.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 154–55.
Lee S. VonSchrader, Disability Statistics from the Current Population Survey,
CORNELL U. (2017), http://www.disabilitystatistics.org/reports/cps.cfm?statistic=employment [perma.cc/6EVG-W3C8].
138. H. Stephen Kaye, Lita H. Jans, and Erica C. Jones, Why Don’t Employers Hire
and Retain Workers with Disabilities? 21 J. OCCUPATIONAL REHAB. 526, 528–31
(2011); contra Les Picker, Did the ADA Reduce Employment of the Disabled?, THE
NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. (May 25, 2009), http://www.nber.org/digest/nov04/w10528.html [perma.cc/J5TK-QP6Y].
139. Kaye, supra note 138, at 529.
140. Id. at 534 (explaining that the cost of reasonable accommodations for employees is not fiscally justifiable for employers compared to the risk of lawsuit).
141. Schurin, supra note 77, at 153–54.
142. Id. at 154–55.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

15

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 10

866

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

blow.143 This may be because the ADA and SIFs have different approaches to
the same problem: the former discourages discriminatory practices and the latter encourages non-discriminatory practices.144
Who should assume the liability when a SIF is repealed? In Missouri,
courts have conclusively agreed that liability shifts back to the employer. 145
Under the ADA, employers are unable to make employment decisions based
on a belief that the new employee may increase workers’ compensation costs
for the employer in the future.146 This essentially forces the employer to accept
an employee as they are, including their “high risk” nature.147 This effect becomes especially pronounced in an aging workforce.148 The result of forcing
this “high risk” liability on the employer creates the same result as reasonable
accommodations under the ADA: the threat of hard to prove litigation will not
override the financial concern of potential future liability for a workplace injury.149 Because SIFs are prospective in nature – whereas the ADA is retrospective in nature – the former operates as the “carrot” and the latter as the
“stick.”150 This contradicts the common perception that the two laws overlap
in their function.151 This is not to say that the ADA is completely irrelevant to
the purposes of a SIF – but rather they are complementary.152 The ideal approach would account for both the purpose and function of SIF statutes and the
ADA.153 The ADA is capable of picking up the slack left behind by the repeal
or reduction in scope of SIF statutes.154 This is the approach the Missouri General Assembly took in 2013 by reducing SIF liability for the less vital issues,
which are still actionable under the ADA.155 This better serves the more pressing needs of permanent, totally disabled workers by increasing the SIFs overall
ability to pay its liabilities.156
In short, the ADA is not a compelling justification for an honest and informed legislator to eliminate SIFs altogether, as the results and methods of the
143. Id. at 154.
144. Id. at 158–59.
145. See Fed. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 371 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Mo. 1963) (“[i]n

the absence of an apportionment statute or second injury fund legislation, the employer
is liable for the entire disability resulting from a compensable injury . . .”).
146. Hancock, supra note 71, at 540.
147. Gary Kern, Editorial: Gary Kern, in Defense of the Second Injury Fund, LA.
COMP. BLOG (Dec. 14, 2017), http://compblog.com/editorial-gary-kern-in-defense-ofthe-second-injury-fund/ [perma.cc/UA64-6RKF].
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. McClitis, supra note 57, at 415–16.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.220 (2018).
156. McClitis, supra note 57, at 416.
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ADA are insufficient to achieve the goals of SIFs. This begs the question of
what a legislature should do if they cannot use the ADA to justify the removal
of SIFs and they cannot allow the funds to continually accrue liability until the
point of insolvency.157

A. The Missouri SIF’s Dilemma: Wait It Out or Take Action?
The answer is likely somewhere in the middle. States like Missouri have
reduced the scope of SIFs in an effort to maintain solvency.158 Ideally, limiting
liability will “encourage the employment of individuals who are already disabled from a preexisting injury, regardless of the type or cause of that injury”
while still managing to keep the costs of the SIF low enough to maintain solvency.159 If the holding of Gattenby had been left undisturbed, the results could
have been contrary to the goals of the 2013 legislation; namely, reducing liability of the SIF.160
Prior to Gattenby, the primary issue facing the Missouri SIF was its “financial status and future funding.”161 The 2013 Amendments purported to
solve both of these issues by narrowing the types of claims that could be made
against the Missouri SIF after a certain date and allowing for a temporary increase to the surcharge that funded the SIF.162
After Gattenby, the less favorable 2013 Amendment language only applied to claims where both the prior and the subsequent injury occurred after
January 1, 2014.163 The result is a gradual reduction in liability to the SIF over
the years, as less claims receive the more favorable pre-2013 Amendment language simply because fewer prior injuries happened before 2014. For example,
in the year 2060, there will be far less claims using the pre-2013 language,
simply because far fewer workers will have even been alive before 2014 to
receive an injury in the first place. As time passes, the revised SIF language
will achieve the ultimate goal of limiting the overall liability of the Missouri
SIF. Even with the changes, SIF liability is still too high and not decreasing
fast enough.164 An increase in surcharges alone is insufficient to permanently

157. Id. at 412 (explaining that SIF liability would remain even after the law itself
is repealed).
158. See infra Part III.B.
159. Pierson v. Treasurer of Mo., 126 S.W.3d 386, 389–90 (Mo. 2004) (en banc)
(per curiam) (citing Boring v. Treasurer of Mo., 947 S.W.2d 483, 487-88 (Mo. Ct. App.
1997), overruled by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003)
(en banc)).
160. See Gattenby v. Treasurer of Mo., 516 S.W.3d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2017).
161. McClitis, supra note 57, at 416.
162. See infra Part III.B.
163. 516 S.W.3d at 862.
164. 2017 Annual Report, supra note 100, at 22 (showing an increase in claims
against the Missouri SIF after the Gattenby decision).
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lower SIF liability because the surcharge increase is set to end in 2021.165 The
surcharge increase was meant to serve as a temporary basis for repairing an
insolvent fund, but a virtually unchanged mode of liability may negate that effect.166 By the time liability is lessened – which could have taken a while under
Gattenby – the surcharge will be gone and the Missouri SIF would have been
in the same financially precarious situation it found itself in to begin with.167
The Missouri SIF, however, does not have this problem any longer due to the
ruling in Cosby.
The abrogation of Gattenby does not necessarily solve all of the Missouri
SIF’s problems. The 2013 Amendments, while important to maintaining the
Missouri SIF, may have actually harmed it by negatively affecting the employment rates of individuals with disabilities.168 In the span of a single year following the amendments, disabled employment took a significant dip, though it
quickly recovered.169

V. CONCLUSION
The Missouri SIF has maintained solvency and stayed active by reducing
its scope of liability. To keep the SIF functional, the General Assembly has
taken steps to continuously reduce this liability as time goes on. Despite a brief
period of uncertainty due to the decision in Gattenby, the Missouri SIF’s fate
was unclear. The Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision in Cosby has helped to
clarify the Missouri SIF’s fate. Despite this, the road to continued solvency is
not a simple one. As the Missouri SIF begins to recover financially, it may
renew the vigor with which litigants pursue their claims, driving up the Missouri SIF’s liability yet again. This may require continued maintenance of the
Missouri SIF over time, such as structural changes to its funding or further
reductions in liability.
The General Assembly should understand that the SIF is worthwhile because it produces valuable benefits for at-risk populations. The SIF’s liabilities
can be reduced by introducing simple, clear, and consistent legislative language
– such that it avoids the issue found in Gattenby – that serves to protect disabled
workers. In 2009, another commentator stated, “It will take a commitment by
the legislature to make changes to the [Missouri SIF] and to reevaluate such
MO REV. STAT. § 287.715.6 (2018).
Id.
McClitis, supra note 57, at 418.
Compare Lee Erickson, 2014 Disability Status Report: Missouri, CORNELL
UNIVERSITY YANG TAN INST. ON EMP. AND DISABILITY, 5 (2016), http://www.disabilitystatistics.org/StatusReports/2014-PDF/2014-StatusReport_MO.pdf,
[perma.cc/694B-AMP8] with Lee Erickson, 2013 Disability Status Report: Missouri,
CORNELL UNIVERSITY YANG TAN INST. ON EMP. AND DISABILITY, 5 (2015),
http://www.disabilitystatistics.org/StatusReports/2013-PDF/2013StatusReport_MO.pdf. [perma.cc/R7Z2-DGWU].
169. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
165.
166.
167.
168.
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changes to determine their effectiveness.”170 The future effectiveness of the
2013 amendments is questionable, but the attempt to limit liability, adequately
finance the SIF, and improve the labor market for disabled workers are worthwhile goals. The question remains whether the legislature will need to reevaluate the SIF and institute further changes to maintain solvency of the Missouri
SIF. Doing so may just guarantee the continued protection of disabled employees by the Second Injury Fund for generations to come.

170. McClitis, supra note 57, at 422.
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APPENDIX A: LIABILITY PORTIONS OF SIF STATUTES BY STATE
State

Sunset

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado

x

Connecticut

x

Delaware
Florida

x

Georgia

x

Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas

x

Kentucky

x

Louisiana

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss3/10

No Congruent
SIF

Statute
ALA. CODE § 25-5-57
(1975) (repealed 1992)
ALASKA STAT. §
23.30.205 (West 2018)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
23-1065 (2019)
ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9525 (2019)
CAL. LAB. CODE § 4751 (
(2019)
COLO. REV. STAT. § 846-101 (2018)
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31349 (2019)
DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 19
§ 2327 (2017)
FLA. STAT. § 440.49
(2018)
GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9360 (2018)
HAW. REV. STAT. § 38633 (2018)
IDAHO CODE § 72-332
(2019)
820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
305/8 (2016)
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-33-13 (LexisNexis 2014)
IOWA CODE § 85.64
(2019)
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44567 (West 2018)
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
342.120 (West 2019)
LA. STAT. ANN. §
23:1378 (2019)
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Maine
Maryland

Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota

Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska

x

Nevada

New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York

x

North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio

871

ME. STAT. tit. 39 § 57
(1990) (repealed 1991)171
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. &
EMPL. § 9-802 (West
2018)
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 152, § 37 (West 2019)
MICH. COMP. LAWS Ann.
§ 418.521 (West 2019)
MINN. STAT. Ann. §
176.131 (West 1990) (repealed 1992)
MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-373 (West 2019)
MO. REV. STAT. §
287.220 (2018)
MONT. CODE ANN. § 3971-907 (West 2018)
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §
48-128 (LexisNexis
2014)
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
616B.587 (LexisNexis
2014)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
281-A:54 (West 2019)
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:1595 (West 2018)
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-26 (2018) (repealed 1996)
N.Y. WORKER’S COMP.
LAW § 15 (McKinney
2018)
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9740.1 (2018)
N.D. CENT. CODE § 6504-18 (2013)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4123.343 (Lexis Nexis
2016)

171. See also Church v. McKee, 387 A.2d 754, 755–56 (Me. 1978) (utilizing the
liability of the now-repealed fund)
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Oklahoma

Oregon

x

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

South Carolina

x

South Dakota

x

Tennessee
Texas
Utah

Vermont
Virginia

x

Washington
West Virginia

x

Wisconsin
Wyoming

x

[Vol. 84

OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, §
172 (2011) (repealed
2011)
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
656.622 (West 2019)
77 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 516 (West
2019)
28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 2837-4 (1997) (repealed
1998)
S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9400 (2018)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
62-4-34 (1998) (repealed
1999)
TENN. CODE ANN. § 506-2018 (2018);
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §
408.162 (West 2019)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A2-703 (Lexis Nexis
2018)172
Never functional173
VA. CODE ANN. § 65.21103 (2018)
WASH. REV. CODE §
5116.120 (2018)
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-9b
(2018)
WIS. STAT. § 102.59
(2018)
See Hancock, supra note
71, at 543 (arguing for
the implementation of a
SIF in Wyoming).

172. See Second Injury Fund v. Streator Chevrolet, 709 F.2d 1176, 1183 (Utah
1985) (describing nature of SIF liability).
173. See S.C. Audit, supra note 66 (referencing the inoperability of Vermont’s second injury fund).
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